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1. Introduction
One of the consequences of European integration is the increasing permeability of
national borders. This development has major effects on the position of border regions.
According to many these previously peripheral (in context of the nation state) regions
will become linking regions in an integrating Europe. To make most of these
opportunities, new claims on the region's infrastructure, physical planning and
environment will have to be met (e.g. provision of adequate cross-border infrastructure).
These new challenges require co-ordinated action by the local and regional governments
in European border regions. The EU has recognised the importance of regional cross-
border co-operation and has reserved substantial funds to provide regional and local
governments with incentives to set up networks of cross-border co-operation and help
these regions in developing regional policies to compensate for their relative isolation.
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In response to these developments Dutch local and regional governments and linked non-
governmental bodies, together with their counterparts in Germany and Belgium, have
established institutions for cross-border co-operation. These networks, based on
voluntary co-operation, should provide the political and administrative structures to
develop and manage new regional cross-border policies. Are these structures of
governance really adequate? Stated more comprehensively the central question in this
paper is: Do these structures meet the criterion of legitimacy, are these new regional
structures of governance fit to provide these regions with adequate regional collective
and quasi-collective goods (allocative efficiency or effectiveness) and finally, do these
new governance structures meet elementary criteria of democratic control over public
policies and funds?
The paper provides a theoretical analysis of the potentials and problems of voluntary
networks for cross-border co-operation as structures for governance of European border
regions.
This discussion will be elucidated with examples along the Dutch-German and the
Dutch-Belgian border.
2. Cross-border co-operation in general
When exploring euregions in a general manner one has to keep in mind that it is possible
to look at this phenomenon from different perspectives. Thus the word euregion is multi-
interpretable and it will be the objective of this section to explore these different
meanings. To start with, cross-border co-operation in general is much broader than the
euregional co-operation strictu senso; therefore we will elaborate on this cross-border
co-operation in general first. Secondly, euregions are shaped along the various levels on
which governments on either part of the border seek co-operation. We will look into
these levels in some more detail.
2.1 Cross-border co-operation: a classification
States co-operate across borders from time immemorial. This so-called international co-
operation is regarded as a stately prerogative based on the age-old assumption of
sovereignty. This ‘normal’ cross-border co-operation on an international2 level, although
of course it is of great influence on the euregional co-operation to be explored, has to be
singled out at first hand. There is a simple explanation for this. When speaking of
euregional co-operation we tend to look at forms of co-operation at a subnational level
even though cross-border co-operation taken literally would imply considering the
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national variant as well. Apart from the exclusion upward we have to differ between
various forms of subnational cross-border co-operation. First, on a decentral level we
can distinguish between, what we would like to call, interregional co-operation and
interlocal co-operation. Both forms are exponents of co-operation between decentral
authorities. But, with regard to interregional co-operation the emphasis is on ‘regional’
authorities3 collaborating, while with regard to interlocal co-operation the accent lies on
local or communal authorities. Both forms can be further divided into cross-border co-
operation at the border and cross-border co-operation between decentral levels of
government, not directly situated at the border4. Euregions, as the word is normally
used, stands for interregional -meaning decentral- cross-border co-operation directly at
the border. This can be put into a scheme in the following manner. The words in italics -
taken together - represent the form of cross-border co-operation we are interested in this
paper (see figure 15).
Figure 1 at about here
As can be seen from the scheme, the interlocal co-operation is not our main interest in
this paper. This separation has to be handled with care however since, as we will see
later, co-operation within euregions very often has an extended-local character itself.
What we mean is the cleavage between pure local co-operation, e.g. between two border
municipalities6 and the co-operation between many local authorities on both sides of the
border, which on their part form a new cross-border regional level.
2.2. Co-operation at various levels
Closely connected and partly a further clarification to the previous paragraph and
anticipating on paragraphs to come are the different levels on which public authorities
work together across national borders7.
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a) The first form of cross-border co-operation is what we would like to call interlocal
co-operation This co-operation, only at a communal level,  promotes a common
interest that the various, contributing partners share. Very often this common interest
lies in the field of economics. As can be seen from the above-mentioned scheme
interlocal co-operation can take place directly at the border or between communities,
not directly situated at the border but having a common interest; e.g. when all partners
are major harbours within there country and they share similar possibilities and
problems. Another form of interlocal co-operation are the well known jumelages
between municipalities. These are very often based on personal contacts between
public officials. These jumelages are mostly a form of ‘interlocal co-operation not at
the border’. That is why they are not discussed here. The same applies to partnerships
of towns, which are formed all across Europe and which are very often of a trilateral
or even quadrilateral nature. These partnerships tend to be somewhat more
institutionalised than the jumelages because they often validate there co-operation
through some sort of (quasi-) official document. The aim of these forms of co-
operation very often do not exceed cultural meetings and exchanges.
b) Another form of cross-border co-operation is interregional in nature. Like the
interlocal co-operation this form is often used, this time by regional authorities, to co-
operate on the basis of a common economic interest. The well-known  ‘four (now
five) motors of Europe’ is a good example of this form of co-operation.
c) The real euregional co-operation stands for co-operation on a subnational level
between authorities that are situated at the border. This form of co-operation  can
take several (juridical) forms and can have different objectives, e.g. of a cultural-, an
economic- or an infrastructural nature.
d) Finally, on a national level there is also co-operation that has regional dimensions.
Very often this co-operation takes the form of  bilateral or trilateral commissions, like
the two cross-border spatial planning-commissions for the northern and southern
Dutch-German border or the bilateral Dutch-Flemish language commission.
3. A general survey on the euregions along the Dutch-Belgian-German border from a
juridical perspective
The first question we want to answer is: Are these juridical forms of co-operation and
different degrees of institutionalisation legitimate?
To answer this question, we will have to look at the various possible juridical structures,
which are currently in use regarding decentral cross-border co-operation. Additionally,
we will have a look at the different degrees of institutionalisation regarding decentral
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cross-border co-operation. Then, we will present a concept of legitimacy, which we used
to ‘evaluate’ this co-operation in general. Taking into account the cross-border co-
operative forms along the Dutch-German and the Dutch-Belgian border, we highlight
certain parameters of legitimacy and apply it to the cases.
3.1 Juridical ‘possibilities’ of cross-border co-operation and different degrees of
institutionalisation
Co-operation between subnational authorities on different sides of the border can take
various forms:
At the lowest level we can see an informal or non-formal8 form of co-operation. In this
category the non-binding character of the co-operation is characteristic. The co-
operation is thus more of a moral-political nature. Beyerlin (1989:290) speaks of ‘bloße
Interaktionen’ that can do without any form of institutionalisation . These forms are
therefore of  a pure informal nature and mostly formed on a ad hoc basis. Ress (1987: 2)
speaks of ‘schlichte Kooperation’ (modest co-operation) characterised by informal
contacts and exchange of information. According to him it is better to speak of co-
ordination than of co-operation since actually there is no real co-operation. Within this
category it is possible to draw a distinction between co-operation with a low and co-
operation with a high degree of institutionalisation  (oude Veldhuis 1995: 72 en Uijen
a.o. 1994: 6). The first sub-category (low institutionalisation ) is characterised by the fact
that these ‘agreements’ are juridical non-binding, that they are of a political-moral nature,
that they very often only have an ‘ad-hoc character’, that there are only ad-hoc working
groups and that they are mostly supported by only few people. The second category
(high institutionalisation ) like the first is juridically non-binding and of a political-moral
nature. There are, however, more frequent contacts within a quasi-formal organisation
between very often more people. In both types of co-operation there is no sort of
democratic legitimisation.
One stage higher there is co-operation based on civil law. This co-operation is
characterised by the fact that there is some kind of institutionalisation  of the co-
operation based on the civil law of one of the participating countries. It is also possible
that the co-operation is based on both (or more) law systems, although it must be said
that in the light of the ‘loi unique’ principle - which says that only one law system is
applicable - there are problems connected to this multilateral civil law body.
Hypothetically, there even is a third variant; the ‘legal person sui generis’ but since there
is not a international legal basis for this we don’t discuss it any further. There are several
problems connected to cross-border co-operation based on civil law. First, there is a
problem that the new established authority cannot act in a public sense. Furthermore,
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since it lacks a public law basis, it cannot take legally binding public acts. This is closely
related to the third problem of co-operation based on civil law; there is only a very low
level of democracy related to this kind of co-operation. Control, openness of the public
process, publicity, participation and representativeness all have to be missed within this
category (see also: Kessen, 1992: 82).
The next option is that there is a basis for the co-operation within public law. Compared
to the previous two forms there are several, obvious advantages:
1. it is possible to hand over certain legislative and/or administrative tasks to this new
public body;
2. in a further elaborated form, this public co-operation could even take into account the
cross-border judicial protection of civilians living within the euregional area; this leads
to the fact that several sectoral government tasks (environment, spatial planning,
education) can be dealt with, although there still will be a large degree of  dependency
on national authorities;
3. a next advantage is that there can be a directly or indirectly chosen public body
representing the interest of the civilians living within the euregion; the co-operation is
based on a formal legal document;
4. finally, most often there will be a good organisational structure connected to this for
of public co-operation.
For a long time it was only possible to work together across the order in an
informal/non-formal manner or by using civil law. This situation appeared to be
unsatisfactory. There are several reasons for that. First, it is not possible for these non-
public cross-border authorities to hold public responsibilities. This means that there is no
real decision-making power in regard to policy-fields that could fall within the
responsibility of these authorities. Second, since these non-public authorities have no
decision-making power based on transnational public law they cannot bind either the
national participating public authorities within the euregion nor the civilians living in the
euregional area. Third, co-operation based on civil law is not equipped for problems that
are mostly of a public character (e.g. infrastructure, employment). This is why initiatives
were taken to look for a public law basis of cross-border co-operation.
In this respect mainly the Council of Europe has been vary active. Its efforts led to the
so-called European Outline Convention9 (further: EOC), which was signed in 1981 in
Madrid (therefore also: Convention of Madrid). Its aim is to facilitate and to promote
transfrontier co-operation between territorial communities or authorities within the fields
of responsibility that these authorities and communities possess. The EOC is restricted to
co-operation  in border areas (see also: Seerden 1993: 42). An interesting question in this
respect is whether the EOC has to be regarded only as ‘declaration of intent’ or as a
juridical basis for cross-border co-operation on its own. Beyerlin (1989: 326) speaks of
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‘Dachverträge’ (umbrella treaties) and thinks that additional interstate treaties are
necessary as juridical bases for cross-border co-operation (Beyerlin 1980: 590). Seerden
(1993: 47) sees the two-sided nature of the EOC; in several explanatory documents we
can read that the EOC is a sufficient tool for this co-operation, in reality, however,
additional interstate agreements on cross-border co-operation seems to be the conditio
sine qua non for actual co-operation between decentral authorities. In an earlier part of
his book on transfrontier co-operation he comes to the conclusion that subnational cross-
border co-operation is not a part  of international law, but must be seen as a part of
national (public) law (Seerden 1993: 34/35). Since decentral authorities don’t have the
power or ability to act on an international scale; they don’t have a treaty-making
capacity. In this sense the difference between ‘les relations publiques internationales’ and
‘les relations transfrontalières’ seems applicable (Seerden 1993: 37).
When the EOC is to be regarded as ‘soft law’, then we have to look for more compelling
norms for cross-border co-operation. In this respect there are at least two treaties worth
mentioning. First, there is a BENELUX-treaty regarding cross-border co-operation
between territorial communities or authorities (BENELUX-verdrag inzake
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen territoriale samenwerkingsverbanden of
autoriteiten),which was signed in September 1986 and which came into effect on 1-4-
1991. On the basis of this treaty one of the three cross-border co-operative bodies was
transformed into a public body (BENEGO) and one was transformed into a common
administrative body (euregion Scheldemond) (Deekens 1997: 6).
A second treaty that was signed as a result of the EOC is the Treaty between the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, the ‘Land’ Nordrhein-
Westfalen and the ‘Land’ Niedersachsen regarding cross-border co-operation between
territorial communities or authorities (Dutch-German Agreement) (Overeenkomst tussen
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, het Land Nedersaksen
en het Land Noordrijn-Westfalen inzake grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen
territoriale gemeenschappen of autoriteiten). This treaty was signed at the German
bordertown of Isselburg-Anholt on 23-5-1991 and it came into effect on 1-1-1993. Like
the BENELUX-treaty the Dutch-German agreement makes it possible for decentral
public authorities to co-operate in a public sense. An interesting question is whether or
not this public co-operation forms part of international law or should be regarded as
being a part of the respective domestic law systems of the countries involved. Cross-
border public authorities that will fall within the scope of the Dutch-German treaty are
surely no international organisations (Seerden 1993: 177 and 215) and one can say that
the applicability of national law even towards these cross-border co-operations remains
intact.
Basically, within this agreement there are three possible juridical forms for co-operation:
Article 2 section 2 says that:
‘Notwithstanding the possibilities to co-operate on a civil law basis, co-operation can
take place in the following forms:8
1. making a common regulation by which a public body is established;
2. making a common regulation without establishing a public body or common
administrative body;
3. making a common regulation by which a common administrative body is established.
Although, the public body is the far-reaching form of cross-border co-operation made
possible, it is not possible to enact binding regulations for civilians within the territory of
this newly established public body (art. 5 of the treaty). Binding norms can only be
directed towards public authorities within the cross-border public body (e.g. a euregion),
which have to make their own regulations to bind civilians within their territory. The
internal law of the state of which the co-operating authorities form part is still applicable.
This means that with regard to the supervision of the decisions that are taken by the
public authority and the legal   protection there can be a conflict of norms.
3.2. Euregional co-operation along the Dutch border
When we look at the euregions at the German-Dutch border there are several juridical
forms currently in use. From north to south along the Dutch-German border there are
five euregions.
Figure 2 at about here
The Eems-Dollard region, established in 1977 and containing parts of the Dutch
provinces Groningen and Drenthe and of the German Länder Niedersachsen (the Kreise
Aurich, Emsland, Leer and Wittmund and the kreisfreie Stadt Emden , is a organisation
which has a bilateral civil law character; according to Dutch law it is a stichting
(corporation) and according to German law it is an eingetragener Verein (registered
association). Members of this stichting are communities, chambers of commerce,
interlocal organisations, one professional chamber and the east-Friesian region.
Currently, the Eems-Dollard region is working on a common regulation, which is based
on the German-Dutch treaty on cross-border co-operation. The German eingetragener
Verein is a member of the Dutch stichting. The same persons have a seat in the boards of
both civil authorities. The initiative to form the Eems-Dollard region was taken by the
chambers of  commerce, the province of Groningen, the regional council of East-
Groningen and several communities (oude Veldhuis, 1995: 27).
The EUREGIO, also called the Euregion Rijn-Ems-Ijssel,  was established in 1958 and is
the oldest of the euregions in Europe. It contains parts of the Dutch provinces Drenthe,
Overijssel and Gelderland and the German Landkreise Grafschaft Bentheim, parts of the
Landkreis Emsland, parts of the Kreis Borken and the Kreise Borken, Coesfeld and9
Steinfurt. The initiative was taken by communities on both sides of the border. The
EUREGIO is a non-formal cross-border co-operative body, which nevertheless has a
rather high degree of institutionalisation , since it has a common German-Dutch
secretariat, a representative body called the EUREGIO-council and a common charter.
Members are 106 communities and the Kreise. Like the euregion Eems-Dollard the
EUREGION is currently, at the basis of the Dutch-German treaty, trying to work out a
regulation for a cross-border public body. The EUREGIO is a form of pure cross-border
upper-local co-operation since its own members are the communities within the area of
the EUREGION. Recently, the euregion has concluded some ‘association-agreements’
with the kreisfreie Städte Münster and Osnabrück. Eventually, both towns will be
integrated into the Euregional structure.
Between 1978, from its establishment, until 1993 the euregion Rijn-Waal was a non-
formal co-operative body and currently, since 1993, it is the only cross-national public
body at the German-Dutch border based  on the German-Dutch treaty.  It’s seat is in the
German town of Kleve. It is made up of the Dutch area around Arnhem and mid-
Gelderland, the area around Nijmegen and the North-eastern part of the province of
Brabant. At the German side it is made up of the Kreise Kleve and Wesel and the
kreisfreie Stadt Duisburg. The initiative was taken by the belangengemeenschap
Rivierengebied Gelderland (an interest-group for the River area Gelderland), the
Niederrheinische Industrie-und Handelskammer (chamber of coomerce) and the city of
Emmerich. Formally, the euregion Rijn-Waal would have the power to bind its members
on a public law basis. Nevertheless, within the short period that it is now working on a
public law basis it shows that also in this environment the initial readiness to co-
operation from all members is necessary to get things done. Apart from that only few real
public tasks ands responsibilities are actually handed over to the newly created public
body. At the board of the public body there are members of municipalities and regional
authorities at both sides of the border. Apart from that the Chambers of Commerce and
the Landschaftsverband Rheinland are members.
The euregion Rijn-Maas North was established in 1978 and is made up of the Dutch
north-and middle Limburg areas and the German kreisfreie Städte Mönchengladbach and
Krefeld, the southern part of the Kreis Kleve and the Kreise Viersen and Neuss. The
initiative was taken by the chambers of commerce and local authorities. Until 1993 its
name was border-region Rijn-Maas North. Members are intermunicipal co-operation
bodies at the Dutch side, the Dutch and  German Chambers of Commerce and several
German border-cities. The euregion has a low level of institutionalisation ; f.i. it has only
a very small own secretariat, which is placed in annex to the town administration of the
city of Mönchengladbach.
The euregion Rijn-Maas was established in 1976 and is made up of the southern part  of
the Dutch province of Limburg, the Belgian provinces Limburg and Luik/Liège, the
German-speaking community in Belgium and Region Aachen e.V., a registered10
association made up of the kreisfreie Stadt Aachen and the Kreise Aachen, Düren,
Euskirchen and Heinsberg. All mentioned public authorities are members. Since 1991 the
euregion Maas-Rijn is a stichting according to Dutch law, which has its seat in
Maastricht: in that sense it conforms to the ‘loi unique-principle’. Until that period it was
a non-formal co-operative form. The euregion Maas-Rijn is the only region that is made
up of ‘real’ regional authorities; it doesn’t contain an  extended local element like the
other regions do. It has however, since it established a Euregional council in 1995, a
representative body which is made up of 60 % representatives from political bodies and
40 % representatives from societal organisations like chambers of commerce, trade
unions, universities and employers. In this sense this euregion is unique and the future
will show how this combined political-societal system will work out.
Another organisation worth mentioning is the Nieuwe Hanze Interregio/Neue Hanze
Interregion a co-operation between the northern provinces in the Netherlands
(Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe and Overijssel) and the  German Länder Niedersachsen
en Bremen., which was established in 1991. The participants want to strengthen the
geographical, cultural and economic sense of belonging through administrative co-
operation (Raven en Tromp 1993: 24). Until now the results of the co-operation are
rather modest and it has to be seen whether or not it will turn into a successful cross-
border organisation in the future. Divergent from the euregions is the fact that the
Nieuwe Hanze Interregio has a much bigger scale. Apart from that it is also a
collaboration between only regional authorities on both side of the border; only the
euregion Maas-Rijn comes close to here in this respect. Actually, the Nieuwe Hanze
Interregio shows more similarities with the ‘umbrella’ transfrontier organisations
(Strassoldo, 1982: 129) or ‘working communities’ (Arbeitsgemeinschaften), mainly
situated in the alpine-area like Alpen-Adria or Arge Alp, that cover a much bigger area
than the smaller euregions.
When we look at euregional  co-operation along the Belgian-Dutch border we can also
see varying degrees of institutionalisation and different juridical forms.
The euregion Benelux-mid area (Benelux-middengebied) consists of the Dutch
provinces of Noord-Brabant and Limburg and the Belgian provinces of Antwerpen,
Brabant and Limburg. This co-operation is regional in character. The euregion has no
legal status whatsoever and must be labelled as a non-formal form of co-operation.
The euregion Benego  is a co-operation between 27 border communities at the Dutch-
Belgian border. This is why it is to be called a extended form of local co-operation. This
euregion became a public body according to the BENELUX-treaty.
The euregion  Scheldemond is a co-operation between the province of Zeeland in the
Netherlands and the provinces of Oost-Vlaanderen and West-Vlaanderen in Belgium. It
has become a common administrative body based on the BENELUX-treaty.11
Within the current practice of cross-border co-operation along the Dutch border several
dimensions can be distinguished:
1. the partners within the co-operation, which can be further sub-divided into
organisations in which only regional public bodies are members, organisations in
which only (upper-) local authorities are members and organisations in which local
and/or regional authorities are members next to other non-public or quasi-public
organisations are members.
2. the degree of institutionalisation , varying from a very low degree without any
juridical status, through ‘civil law’-structures up until public authorities.
3. the applicability of the BENELUX-Treaty and the Dutch-German agreement and on
the various euregions along the Dutch-Belgian and the Dutch-German border. This
third dimension is represented in the table in bold. Moreover, those euregions which
are striving to become a public authority either under the BENELUX-Treaty or the
Dutch-German Agreement are placed in italics.
This is shown in Table 110:
Table 1 at about here
From Table 1 the conclusion can be drawn that there is a very scattered picture of
juridical forms and degrees of institutionalisation of cross-border co-operation along the
Dutch-German border and the Dutch-Belgian border.
3.3 The legitimacy of cross-border co-operation
The concept of legitimacy is multi-dimensional in character. According to Beetham
(1991: 15) it embodies three distinct elements or levels. Power is legitimate when:
1) it confirms to established rules;
2) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and
subordinate, and
3) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation.
The first and most basic level of legitimacy is that of rules conformity. From a mere
juridical point of view, power is legitimate where its acquisition and exercise conform to
established law. Legitimacy, in this sense, is equivalent to legal validity (Beetham 1991:
4). Whenever power is not exercised according to ‘the’ rules, it is illegitimate. In this
sense, legality is an important component of legitimacy. However, this first dimension of
legitimacy is not enough to understand its full meaning.
The second level can also be described as the ‘justifiability of the rules by reference to
shared beliefs. When is power ‘justifiable’? First, there has to be a valid source of
authority. Second, those holding power have appropriate qualities. And third, there has
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to be a recognisable general interest (Beetham 1991: 17). In this sense, legitimacy entails
the moral justifiability of power relations. Whenever rules are non-justifiable, because of
their deficiency in terms of shared beliefs between rulers and governed, we speak of a
legitimacy deficit. This level of legitimacy is closely connected to the political
philosopher’s idea of rationally normative principles.
The third and last element of the concept of legitimacy is the contribution of the sub-
ordinate. What is needed in this context, is consent by the governed. This leads us to the
field of social science, where one is concerned with the legitimacy in particular historical
societies or governmental contexts. Power relations are no longer legitimate, where
belief in legitimacy has gone. At this level the opposite of legitimacy can be called
delegitimation. Here we see a crucial element of Max Weber’s idea about legitimacy;
legitimacy derives from people’s belief in it (Beetham 1991: 8). However, a given power
relation is not legitimate because people believe it to be, but because it can be justified in
terms of people’s beliefs (Beetham 1991: 11).
It is to these three criteria we have to look, if we want to know what makes power
legitimate (compare: Beetham 1991: 21).
The above can be put in a scheme. We have taken the figure from Beetham (1991: 20)
and changed it slightly (see Table 2).
Table 2 at about here
Of course it is always difficult to apply theoretical frameworks to a given situation. We
will try to make some general remarks, however, although we lack adequate public
opinion survey data to make valid inferences especially with regard to the second and the
third aspect of legitimacy. When we look at the different (juridical) forms of euregions
along the Dutch-German and the Dutch-Belgian border, we still see a great variety in
what we called the level of institutionalisation. We can only guess at the conformity of
established rules or legal validity within non-formal of informal forms of euregional co-
operation. Since there is no legal basis whatsoever, we can nothing but ‘conclude’ that
the legal validity of these forms of co-operation is low. We are not saying that they are
totally illegitimate, but there is tendency towards an inadequate legal validation.
When we look at the civil law forms of cross-border co-operation, what stands out is
that these forms have a legal basis. The question remains, however, whether or not this
non-public form of organisation is the most appropriate when tasks and responsibilities
lie in the field of common interest.
The highest institutionalised form, which is based on public law, most certainly comes
closest to a legitimate form of cross-border co-operation, when we look at legal validity.
But even with regard to this form the question remains what its genuine legal basis is.
Legal acts taken by public law based euregional bodies are still forced to conform to at
least two national law systems. As long as this cross-border co-operation lacks a law13
basis of its own (sui generis) or as long  as there is no direct link between the European
Union’s legal order and that of the euregions, euregions will be ‘sandwiched’ between
the applicability of different and often divergent law systems.  A first step towards a
more coherent basis for Euregional public law based co-operation would be the
internalisation of the EOC in the European Union’s legal order. In the future this would
mean that euregions no longer need the consent of national authorities to form public
authorities but can refer to European regulation. Here we touch upon the problem of
sovereignty as the leading principle in the relations between states.
When we look at the moral justifiability of a euregional authority or its decisions, it is
far from clear whether there is any kind of reference to shared beliefs. Since we speak of
divided and sometimes artificial communities in the first place, it is not easy to serve a
recognisable general interest, rather than simply the interest of the powerful (Beetham
1991: 17). Even within a national situation it is hard to secure a legitimatory, common
shared moral basis for public acts.
With respect to the demonstrable expression of consent as the third criterion of
legitimacy, the odds are also against euregional co-operation. This part of legitimacy, at
least in democratic circumstances, runs through general elections. There are of course
euregional forms of co-operation that involve some kind of participation. Universal
suffrage through direct elections, in terms of participation probably the next-best
solution11, is not taken care off at all. This is why we still have to guess for the people’s
consent towards actions taken by euregional bodies. The best guarantee for participation
is that of indirect elections of a euregional parliament or chamber of representatives. No
euregion has a direct legitimatory basis through general election of its legislative body.
Again, we literally come to the borders of present possibilities. It simply is not possible
to let the people express their consent in euregional politics and policies by the given
standards.
Concluding, we may say that the legitimate basis for euregional co-operation is rather
weak. On all three aspects of  legitimacy euregions show deficiencies.
According to Beetham (1991: 33) legitimacy is not the only factor contributing to the
order, stability and effectiveness of a system of power; organisational capacities and
resources are obviously crucial as well. We therefore will continue with a discussion on
democratic control and economic efficiency. To research the criterion of democratic
control and efficiency we limited ourselves to one case. From Figure 1 we chose the
Euregion Rijn-Waal as a region with one of the most elaborate forms of public law based
co-operation.
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4. A general survey on the euregions from a political science perspective
The second question we want to raise is: “Do the new governance structures in
euregions meet elementary criteria of democratic control over public policies and
funds?”  As stated above we will restrict ourselves to a discussion on the euregion Rijn-
Waal (ERW).
4.1. Democratic control
The criterion of democratic control refers to the control over binding collective decisions
by the citizens that are (most) affected by these decisions or by their chosen
representatives. Moreover in this process each member’s interests are entitled to equal
consideration. (cf. Dahl 1989:106-118). This standard implies at least that the decisions
on the provision of regional collective and quasi-collective good should be controlled
directly or indirectly by the most affected citizens. In her dissertation, Traag (1993) has
developed a set of criteria to evaluate the democratic quality of co-operative
arrangements between Dutch municipalities. These criteria are appropriate in the case of
cross-border co-operation by public law too, since the legislation in the Dutch-German
treaty is analogous to the Dutch law on inter-municipal co-operation.
Traag’s criteria relate to the
- possibilities for direct citizen participation
- the system of political representation and decision-making
- control of  the inter-municipal assembly and executive (Traag 1993: 77-120).
These criteria will be employed to evaluate the nature of democratic control in the
institutional context of  the Euregion Rijn-Waal (ERW). This analysis pertains to formal
regulations, although we will make some additional tentative remarks on the ‘rules in
action’.
As for possibilities of direct citizen participation the most striking deficit of this co-
operative body is the impossibility for the citizens in the region to elect the members of
the region’s parliamentary assembly in general and direct elections. The Dutch-German
treaty rules out this possibility since it conceives of these  regional governments as a
form of extended sub-national government.12 If a co-operative body is to have a
parliamentary assembly and an executive board (as is the case in the Euregion Rijn
Waal), its members are representatives of the region’s subnational governments, not of
the region’s citizens. In the ERW each participating sub-national government elects one
or more of the members of its supreme organ as its representative(s) to the ERW-
assembly. In the case of municipal governments, small municipalities (less than 20.000
inhabitants) have one representative, medium-sized (20.000-100.000 inhabitants)
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inter-municipal co-operation.15
municipalities have two, and big municipalities (over 100.000 inhabitants) have three
representatives. Furthermore each municipality delegates a member of its executive
council to the Assembly.
Moreover, the ERW-arrangement, like most Dutch inter-municipal co-operative bodies,
does not provide for a formal general procedure for direct public participation in
decision-making by interested parties and persons.13 An important improvement is that
the ERW-agreement provides for the publicity of the meetings of the assembly.
An important consequence of the regulations on the election of the members of the
ERW-assembly is that it does not allow for an equal representation of citizens
irrespective of their place of residence. If we conceive of the local delegations to the
ERW-assembly as (rather indirect) representatives of their local electorates this system
assigns highly unequal weights to the indirect influence of members of the various
electorates. Each of the four delegates from Nijmegen (147.000) represents 36.750
people, whereas the two honourable members for  Rozendaal (near Arnhem) each
represent a mere 600. This inequality will be exacerbated if decision-making in the ERW-
assembly should operate under unanimity rule. Under such a decision-rule each of the
participants (municipal and other delegations), irrespective of the number of citizens it
represents,  has the power to veto a decision. By the letter of the agreement this is not
the case. The agreement explicitly states that decision-making in the Assembly is by
majority rule.14 Even though, in a strictly legal sense, a regional authority under public
law operating under (simple or qualified) majority rule is authorised to make decisions
concluding all of the municipalities in the region. These powers are, however, in practice
circumscribed by the lack of effective sanctions in case of non-compliance and the
possibility for dissidents to resign as a member (Hirschman’s famous exit-option). If such
an informal unanimity rule is also typical for the decision-making process in cross-border
co-operation under public law, each and every of the participating municipalities,
whatever the size of its population, is capable of blockading any decision it dislikes.15
The third set of criteria relate to the control of the representatives in the ERW-assembly,
and the ERW-executive.16 One of the major advantages of cross-border co-operation
under public law is that this form of collaboration allows for unequivocal safeguards for
                                               
13 One should however consider the Dutch-German treaty does not allow these bodies to enact
generally binding prescriptions (Section 5)
14 Some caution is due, however. Traag’s study on actual decision-making in twenty Dutch inter-
municipal cooperative bodies shows that roll-call votes in the assemblies of these public
authorities are unique events, because no proposals enter on the agenda unless informal
consultations have resulted in unanimous consent by all the participating municipalities (Traag
1993: 243-244).
15 It is not clear, however,  if these informal procedures result in a situation in which even the
tiniest municipality, like Rozendaal, has the nerve and actual capability of vetoing a decision
supported by all the other municipalities.
16 The ERW-executive consists of a chairman, the chairmen of the advisory committees, and
those members of the assembly representing the municipal executive councils of cities with more
than 100.000 inhabitants.16
accountability of the members of the parliamentary assembly as well as the executive.
The ERW-agreement exploits this potential for a secure legal framework for the
accountability of these office-holders. First, the agreement states that members of the
assembly are under an obligation to inform the body of the municipal government they
represent on all crucial matters regarding the ERW, he is required to answer all relevant
questions of his fellows from that body, and is obliged to be accountable to this
municipal body.  Once a member of the assembly no longer enjoys the support of the
majority in this body, he can be forced to resign as a member of the assembly.  In
addition to these safeguards the ERW-secretariat is required to distribute the agenda,
proposals and proceedings of all meetings of the assembly to all the municipalities and
other participants in the ERW.
Second, according to the agreement, the members of the executive are required to
answer all questions emanating form the assembly within four weeks. Moreover they are
accountable to the ERW-assembly, and once they stop to enjoy the assembly’s
confidence, they will have to resign.
Nevertheless, here too, a note of caution based on the practical experiences with rather
similar regulations in Dutch inter-municipal co-operative bodies, are in order. For one
thing, according to virtually 75 percent of all municipal delegates in twenty inter-
municipal co-operative bodies, members of the Dutch municipal councils (unless they are
members of the assembly) typically take little or no interest in inter-municipal co-
operation (Traag 1993: 191-192).17  For another thing, most Dutch inter-municipal
executives are completely composed of full-time politicians (often mayors) recruited
from the municipal executives. Council-members, typically amateur-politicians, generally
lack time and other resources to serve as an executive in these executives. The same
factors make it difficult for councilmen serving on the assembly to control the inter-
municipal executive. All-in-all the actual balance of power between the parliamentary
assembly and the executive in Dutch inter-municipal co-operative bodies is tilted heavily
in favour of the latter (SGBO 1989; Everink et. al. 1993: 111-118). This might very well
be the case in cross-border co-operative arrangements, like the ERW, too.
5.  A general survey on the euregions from an economic perspective
The third question we like to answer is whether the new regional structures of
governance fit to provide the border regions with adequate regional collective and quasi-
collective goods on the standard of efficiency in allocation. Where legal questions refer
to the form of the process and democratic control pertains to characteristics of the
decision-making process, efficiency in allocation relates to the outcomes of decision-
                                               
17 Traag, however,  also reports that according to municipal delegates,  members of local
executives take a much more vivid interest in regional affairs.17
making.18 Efficiency in allocation is realised when the level of output of a collective
good is such that the sum of the individual marginal benefits (or the marginal rates of
substitution) of all the potential beneficiaries of this good equals the marginal costs
(Musgrave and Musgrave: 1980: 58-61). In the case of a pure regional collective good
this standard implies that the level of output should reflect the preferences of all the
potential beneficiaries (or consumers).19 Assuming an equal cost-sharing agreement
among the consumers, up to this efficient level of output, increasing the size of the group
of consumers implies a reduction in the ‘price’ of the good (Litvack and Oates 1991:
222-225).20 If, for one reason or another, the preferences of some of the potential
beneficiaries are not considered in determining the level of output for such a regional
collective good, the outcome of the decision-making process will be inefficient or sub-
optimal (Olson 1971: 27-32).
Since Mancur Olson (1971) every social scientist will know that the realisation of an
efficient outcome in the case of the provision of public goods cannot be taken for
granted. Economic theorists, in defining the efficiency conditions for public goods, have
employed models assuming known preferences. But typically such preferences are not
known and political institutions and processes are necessary to reveal these preferences
for public goods and to determine how to bear the costs of providing for these
commodities (Musgrave and Musgrave 1980: 61). Different institutional conditions
produce different results. In this section we will formulate some hypotheses on the
efficiency effects of the institutional structure of the decision-making process in the case
of cross-border co-operation. More specifically: we will concentrate on the case of
cross-border co-operation under public law according to the Euregion Rijn Waal
(ERW)-model discussed before. The ERW-model is deemed to be more appropriate then
co-operation based on private law or informal agreements, when binding collective
decisions with regard to regional economic development  are to be made (e.g.
Driesprong 1993: 76; Kessen 1993: 72).
                                               
18 The standard of efficiency in allocation is closely related to policy responsiveness or
substantive democracy. Both terms refer to the actual concurrence between citizen preferences
and government policy outputs (e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 1994).
19 Pure collective goods are characterised by prohibitive costs of exclusion and non-rival
consumption (Musgrave and Musgrave 1980: 57). Impure public goods are commodities
characterised by joint consumption in combination with costs of congestion (Litvack and Oates
1991: 225). The standard of efficiency in allocation refers to the provision of goods. Provision
pertains to the collective decisions on the quantity and quality of the collective goods to be
provided, how the costs will be covered (prices or taxes) and who will produce the goods (Ostrom
and Ostrom 19..; ACIR 1987). This paper does not deal with the case in which cross-border co-
operation is established in order to benefit from increasing returns to scale in the production of
pure and impure collective goods. Co-operation in the production of goods is considered as
relatively unproblematic, since it is possible to withhold the benefits of this type of co-operation
from free-riders (Denters 1985).
20 In the case of impure collective goods the costs of congestion of each additional consumer will
have to be considered, too. Moreover, in the rest of this paper we will, for reasons of convenience,
use the simple term ‘efficiency’ as a shorthand for the more cumbersome expression ‘efficiency in
allocation’.18
In this analysis we will try to anticipate the consequences (in terms of efficiency) of an
institutional arrangement (the ERW-agreement) with regard to a particular structure of
events (viz. the provision of regional collective goods) making various assumptions on
the motives of the actors (cf. V. Ostrom 1991: 44). The formulation of hypotheses on
the efficiency effects of a specific institutional structure presupposes a theoretical model.
We will begin this theoretical exploration with a rudimentary rational actor model.
Subsequently we will extend this simple model in several directions.
Before we will develop our  model, some simplifications are due to set the stage on
which our actors are to perform.
First, we assume that municipal governments are the only actors relevant in cross-border
co-operation. This assumption works in two directions. On the one hand, the analysis
ignores the possibility of multiple actors from one municipality. This assumption implies
that all participants (e.g. members of the ERW assembly and the ERW executive) coming
from a specific municipality A are considered as representatives of the interests of one
collective actor, municipality A. On the other hand, the analysis does not pay attention to
the possible role of provincial or regional governments, neither as a member of cross-
border co-operative bodies, nor in a supervisory role. We will return to this important
point at the end of the section.
Second, the number of actors is relatively large. In the case of the ERW there are 40
municipal actors; in the EUREGIO-case the number of actors exceeds 100.21
Third, we assume that no single actor has enough resources to provide for some quantity
of this regional good in his own right. Even the provision of one unit (the technical
minimum quantity) of the good is beyond the purchasing power of any of the actors. In
other words, if the good is to be provided contributions by at least two potential
beneficiaries in the region are essential.
Fourth, we assume that actual decision-making in these co-operative bodies typically
operates under unanimity rule. In most cases, the ERW is no exception here, the
assembly has formal powers to make a majority decision. In practice, however, these
powers are circumscribed by the lack of effective sanctions in case of non-compliance
and the possibility for dissidents to resign as a member (see the previous section).
We have just assumed that the actors on the stage of cross-border co-operation are
municipalities. What are the motives determining their behaviour? In the first version of
our model we assume that:
each municipal actor (m) will decide to contribute to the provision of a regional
collective good if and only if the benefits of this good for the citizens of (m) exceed the
price (m) must pay for it (subjective rationality).
that all the municipal actors have equal resources and equal preferences (homogeneity).
that the decision-making process is a one-act-play relating to a single issue.
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taxonomy of groups (Olson 1971: 43-52).19
Under these assumptions no regional collective good will be provided (Olson 1971: 5-
52). On the one hand, none of the numerous actors can make a decisive contribution to
the provision of the regional good. On the other hand, if such a good would somehow be
provided, every actor in the region is able to reap its benefits without having to bear his
share in the costs (due to the impossibility of exclusion). Under these circumstances
voluntary co-operation to provide regional collective goods will not occur. None of the
participants has an incentive to reveal his true preferences with regard to this collective
good and contribute in proportion in bearing its costs. Consequently the good will not be
provided. Even if, for some obscure motive (beyond comprehension from the model’s
perspective), a majority of the regional actors would honestly (on the basis of a
contribution in the costs of production proportional to the true benefits) like to
contribute to a collective agreement the level of output falls short of the efficient level
from a regional perspective. For even in this most unlikely event, this majority will be
unable to force the non-co-operative actors to reveal their preferences and contribute in
the costs of providing the good. There is a clear antagonism between the interest of
individual actors to play down their true preferences for regional collective goods and
the regional interest in efficient levels of output for these commodities. In co-operative
bodies based on a system of extended local government (with a parliamentary assembly
and executive composed of municipal delegates), like the ERW, the municipal interests
are most likely to prevail. This proposition is confirmed by findings from a survey of
twenty inter-municipal co-operative bodies in the Netherlands. Traag finds that a vast
majority (83 percent; N=191) of the members of the assemblies and the executives of
these bodies in case of an actual conflict between their municipal interest and the region’s
interests, decided to defend the interest of their municipality (Traag 1993: 216). The
ERW has an institutional structure very much like the Dutch inter-municipal authorities.
This combination of theory and some empirical results support our initial conclusion: the
prospects for an efficient provision of regional collective goods through cross-border co-
operation operating under public law are not very good.
Of course our initial theoretical assumptions were very stringent. The analysis of
collective action under less exacting assumptions has become a major industry in the
social sciences. Does relaxation of some of these assumptions result in more benign
effects?
First, among others Axelrod (1984) has shown that assuming that decision-making takes
place over time and relates to multiple issues makes the prospect for an ‘evolution of co-
operation’ less gloomy. Axelrod has argued that in many situations the decision to co-
operate takes place under the shadow of the future. Non-co-operation in one setting
(with regard to a particular issue or at one moment in time) might induce others to
retaliate in other settings (with regard to another issue or later on). A rational actor will
include these possible future consequences in his considerations. For this reason co-
operation is more likely in a stable setting, in which the same participants are forced to20
co-operate over a longer period, or in a setting where various issues can be linked, and a
package-deal is possible.22
Second,  we might relax the assumption of homogeneity.23 In a recent contribution
Martin (1994) has argued that the assumption of heterogeneity does relate to both
unequal preferences and inequalities in resources. She concludes that heterogeneity in
capabilities (power) favours the development of mechanism to monitor and enforce co-
operative arrangements and set up credible sanctions against non-co-operators in the
case of iterated games (Martin 1994: 478-481).24 Furthermore she concludes that the
heterogeneity of preferences creates a “potential for mutually advantageous issue
linkage, thus increasing the probability of successful co-operation” (Martin 1994: 490).
In her analysis she even moves one step further when she concludes that: “institutions
that rely on consensus for policy change, rather than accepting some form of majority
voting, will provide fertile grounds for co-operation as long as they incorporate a number
of issues on which participants have different preference intensities. Along a single
dimension consensus requirements are often a recipe for paralysis” (Martin 1994: 489).25
Both these theoretical contributions might offer some consolation for advocates of cross-
border co-operation under institutional arrangements similar to the ERW. To begin with,
the ERW is a permanent body operating on a broad range of issues (socio-economic
development, education and training, transport and traffic, physical planning, culture,
sports, tourism and recreation, environmental issues, health care, social issues,
emergency services, et cetera). It might be argued that the variety of issues is likely to
create a multidimensional agenda (including the German-Dutch dimension) for decision-
making in which there is a potential for issue linkages to circumvent the dangers of
paralysis inherent in (near-)unanimity rule requirements. Furthermore ERW-members are
characterised by huge inequalities in resources. If we use municipal size as a proxy26 the
Dutch actors in ERW are highly unequal (e.g. Nijmegen: 147.000, Arnhem 134.000 but
Rozendaal 1200 and Dodewaard 4000). Of course the effects of all this can only be
decided on the basis of an empirical study of decision-making in the ERW and similar
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23 Olson (1971) has hypothesized that in the case of heterogeneity in small groups sometimes the
most interested actor will provide at least some quantity of the collective good at his own expense
(cf. Denters 1987). The other, less interested actors, will free ride on the efforts of this “large”
actor. In our assumptions this possibility is ruled out.
24 Here Martin’s conclusions contradict one of the conventional propositions about determinants
of the success of co-operation. For instance: Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961: ...) assert:
“concerted action by the various units of government in a metropolitan area is easier to organize
when the costs and benefits are fairly uniformly distributed throughout the area [...] More
difficult problems for the polycentric political system arise when the benefits and the costs are not
uniformly distributed. Communities may differ in their perception of the benefits they receive
from the provision of a common public good” .
25 Cf. Van Dam (1992: 149) who has made a rather similar observation.
26 Municipal size is highly correlated with the size of the municipal political and administrative
apparatus and its financial resources (Denters, de Jong en Thomassen 1991).21
institutions. Such studies are not available as yet. We do, however,  have the results of a
study by Van Dam. He has studied the actual municipal economic policy efforts by Dutch
municipalities. He concludes that tendencies by less interested actors to take a ‘free ride’
on efforts made by municipalities highly interested in the regional collective good
(regional economic development) are not moderated by the participation of these
municipalities in a multi-purpose inter-municipal co-operative body (Van Dam 1992:
117, 155-162). According to Van Dam, these results cast serious doubts on the
appropriateness of Axelrods ”shadow of the future”-hypothesis (Van Dam 1992: 149).
His study does not offer any support for the comforting ideas inherent in recent
theoretical contributions. Apparently, it is difficult to reconcile conflicting municipal and
regional interests within the framework of inter-municipal co-operative bodies.
Of course the results from this one study are far from conclusive. Nevertheless, it is still
too early to conclude that Olson’s pessimistic conclusions on the efficiency of the
outputs emanating from voluntary co-operation only hold under a set of overly restrictive
assumptions.
Finally, and most importantly, we have to relax the first assumption we made, that
municipal governments are the only actors relevant in cross-border co-operation. Above
we discussed horizontal tuning in the production of collective goods, but here we touch
upon the problem of vertical tuning. The theory in economics that deals with this
problem is that of fiscal federalism, where a solution has to be found for centralisation
versus decentralisation. Within the boundaries of a nation each country has its own
internal solution to the dilemma of centralisation and decentralisation (Oates 1972; Van
der Veen 1993: 87). This dilemma consists of the confrontation of decentralising the
provision of public and merit goods to the level of government which most fit to the tastes
of consumers (given their preferences for goods and taxes, Boadway and Wildasin, 1984)
and, on the other hand, centralising government tasks on a high level, because of
economies of scale and external effects. Each country finds her own administrative
structure with, as an example, the Netherlands as a highly centralised country and
Germany as a federal state.
The question now is whether notions of fiscal federalism also can be applied to the
situation of cross-border co-operation (van der Veen and Boot, 1995). Following the
theory there is a ground to equip cross-border regions with those tasks and competencies
which can not be dealt with on a (local) interior level and which need not necessarily to be
dealt with on a (supra) national level. The problem which deserves attention here is that a
specified structure will only be of interest as far as it facilitates or improves the
functioning. There is a lot of discussion about the connection of administrative scale and
functioning. In this debate juridical and economic aspects and political values play a role.
The economic aspects concern efficiency arguments, the political values concern
democracy and legitimacy. Although there seems to be no identical idea of the optimal
administrative scale, economists, jurists and political scientists are aware of the fact that
far-reaching cutting up of administration is not the best solution. From an economic point
of view a patchwork pattern of administration structures will cause enormous decision-22
making costs and face the problems of externalities and missing economies of scale (Oates,
1972). From the political point of view this will cripple effective decision making on
supra-local matters and cause problematic policy co-ordination. And from a juridical point
of view a patchwork pattern type of jurisdictions leads to undemocratic and less
transparent decision making procedures and thus to less legitimacy.
Besides scale of administration, sovereignty is an important factor as well (however the
latter is related to the former). As far as cross-border authorities exist yet -autonomous or
as a consultation-body of composing authorities-, these are confronted with the problem of
lacking competencies to affect measures which can further unification of the region and its
welfare. They have little impact on regional development. Even the construction of small-
scale infrastructure is not possible without intervention and exertion of higher
governments. The smaller the regions are, the more acute this problem is. Until recently,
neither national nor European legislation met the explicit possibility of cross-border
administrative structures.
Applying Olson (1971), this dilemma may, under particular conditions, force
authorities to co-operate. In recent literature the logic of collective action has been applied
to situations of international co-operation (See e.g. Martin, 1994, p. 478). National states
face collaboration dilemmas in case of self-interested behaviour, or co-ordination
dilemmas in case of distributional conflicts. The design of institutions is in both cases
strongly influenced by heterogeneous interests and capabilities. As far as we know there is
no literature how local governments design institutions on cross-border matters, given the
problems national governments have in collaborating or co-ordinating. It is doubtful
whether an individual local (or regional) authority can bring about important changes in,
for instance, spatial structure. Competencies on this matter are usually situated on a higher
level of government, just because of the far-reaching spatial consequences. This justifies
the conclusion that spatial external effects are an important aspect in the discussion about
the rationale of cross-border co-operation27. This argument is perhaps one of the most
advanced. As Anderson (1983: 3) poses:
`As social and economic activities spill over the frontiers or their consequences
come to be strongly felt across the frontier, different levels of transfrontier political and
administrative co-operation become necessary'.
6. Conclusion
Our conclusions are far from rosy. Of course, this is to a considerable extent a
consequence of our approach. We have evaluated (on an ex ante basis) the expected
performance of cross-border co-operation against our exacting standards. If this
approach is employed dogmatically it degenerates into adjudicating earthly practices
                                               
     27For an old-dated but still timely treatise of the problem of bordercrossing externalities see
Sayer (1983).23
employing heavenly standards. It is essential, therefore, to recognise that, to paraphrase
Robert Dahl,  a perfect democracy will never exist on earth. The same, of course, applies
for the second standard, efficiency in the allocation of collective goods and to the third
standard:  legitimacy.
In earthly practices, however, these high ideals can be approximated more or less closely.
We should not focus primarily on the obvious discrepancies between standards and
actual procedures and practices. Whatever system we are to evaluate by these standards
will prove to be wanting. Instead the interesting question should be: how big is the deficit
we are willing to tolerate in a specific case? The willingness to accept deviations will
probably vary with the importance of  the tasks entrusted to the system or subsystem that
is to be evaluated. Cross-border co-operation, more often than not,  is still in its infancy.
As long as the main responsibilities of the Euregions relate to cultural exchange
programmes, and organising the exchange of information and ideas across borders,
probably no one would mind if the organisation would fail to meet the standard of
democratic control. But the targets Euregions set for themselves, become progressively
more ambitious. The ERW for instance covers a wide range of responsibilities (socio-
economic development, education and training, transport and traffic, physical planning,
culture, sports, tourism and recreation, environmental issues, health care, social issues,
emergency services, et cetera).28 In as far as activities in these areas are more far-
reaching than exchanging information and ideas and  include the joint provision of goods
and services things get different. This is even more so, since the Euregio’s are the target
for often generous EU subsidies. Under these circumstances these cross-border public
authorities require a more solid legal foundation providing safeguards for democratic
control and efficiency in allocation.
7. Outlook
In the case of the ERW Dutch and German authorities have employed the Dutch-German
treaty on cross-border co-operation to establish such a legal foundation. First, it should
be emphasised that the procedures adopted by the ERW imply an important
improvement as compared to co-operation under private law or based on informal
practices.  On the other hand, we have concluded, that these arrangements are far from
ideal. The most striking problem with these arrangements is the unbalanced
institutionalisation of the antagonism between local and regional interests. In the current
institutions of the ERW the rights of places (Kincaid 1995: 262) are well-protected. The
ERW is, and was meant to be, a system of extended local government: its institutions are
flooded by representatives of municipal governments. In such a system the rights of
citizens with regard to democratic control, an adequate provision of regional collective
goods and legitimate questions come in second place.
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In systems of public administration based on an essentially territorial division of powers
among a limited number of tiers, regional problems will, in one way or another, always
be difficult to handle. There will always be public needs that cut across jurisdictional
boundaries. Functional federalism  (Casella and Frey 1992: 639-646) might offer a more
satisfactory solution for solving these problems than the forms of extended local
government currently in use. Casella and Frey (1992: 640) characterise such a system as:
“a regime where individuals organise themselves in a pattern of overlapping jurisdictions
without explicit ranking, with each jurisdiction responsible for the provision of a specific
class of public goods” (our emphasis; BD/RS/AV). 29
In such a system of functional federalism special local or regional governments, cutting
across traditional jurisdictions are made responsible for the provision of specific (impure)
collective goods. These functional authorities have to be made accountable and
responsive to the relevant publics they serve (and not, through extended local
government systems, to the guardians of the right of places). The most obvious way of
securing accountability and responsiveness is through popular elections. In this case
accountability is secured by electoral competition. Of course the advantages of a such a
system of functional federalism will have to balanced against the additional administrative
and participation costs of such a system. In many cases these costs will outweigh the
advantages in terms of efficiency in allocation and democratic control. If this is the case
(e.g. when the salience of relevant issues for citizens is relatively low) alternative
institutional structures might be considered. An alternative way to secure a more
adequate provision of regional collective goods and services, in such a case, might be the
establishment of non-elected functional regional governments (Quango’s). These boards,
will have to be independent from other local and regional governments, in order to avoid
the dual responsibility problems inherent in the current system of extended local
government. A crucial question with regard to this solution is, of course, how to secure
the responsiveness and the accountability of the people to be appointed in these boards.
Cochrane (1996: 212) suggests that “through a range of consultative and participative
forums” in combination with mechanisms like referendums, user panels and jury models
might contribute to a democratisation of such non-elective bodies.
Within the current national constitutional frameworks of the Netherlands and Germany
such a system of functional federalism is almost inconceivable. But maybe in the now
emerging new European constitutional order this new type of federalism (as an
alternative to the hierarchical nested model of federalism) might be less utopian.
                                               
29 For rather similar conceptions see: Parks and Oakerson (1989) and ACIR (1987). Cassela and
Frey actually include alliances between local governments under the label of functional
federalism too. Here, however, the problems of extended local government will arise.25
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Table 1: Euregions along the Dutch-German and the Dutch-Belgian border, according to






















civil law character Euregion Maas-Rijn Euregion Eems-
Dollard




Table 2:  Dimensions and criteria of legitimacy
Dimensions of
legitimacy
Criteria of legitimacy if not:
law legal validity illegitimate (breach of rules)
political philosophy moral justifiability legitimacy deficit (discrepancy
between rules and supporting
beliefs, absence of shared
beliefs)
social science evidence of consent delegitimation (withdrawal of
consent)